Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout

View Researcher's Other Codes

Disclaimer: The provided code links for this paper are external links. Science Nest has no responsibility for the accuracy, legality or content of these links. Also, by downloading this code(s), you agree to comply with the terms of use as set out by the author(s) of the code(s).

Please contact us in case of a broken link from here

Authors Stefano Demichells, Amrita Dhillon
Journal/Conference Name Journal of Public Economic Theory
Paper Category
Paper Abstract Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985). Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like pre‚Äźelection polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters about expected turnout. We combine these two features in a model of voter learning in elections and characterize the asymptotically stable equilibria of both complete and incomplete information games in a simple symmetric setting with two candidates. We also show how the model can be used to qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in reality: increases in costs of voting affect turnout adversely but there may be persistence of turnout levels between elections even though costs and other parameters change. Increase in uncertainty increases turnout while increases in the size of the electorate decrease it, in line with intuition.
Date of publication 2010
Code Programming Language Python
Comment

Copyright Researcher 2021