Legislator dissent as a valence signal

View Researcher's Other Codes

Disclaimer: The provided code links for this paper are external links. Science Nest has no responsibility for the accuracy, legality or content of these links. Also, by downloading this code(s), you agree to comply with the terms of use as set out by the author(s) of the code(s).

Authors Rosie Campbell, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, Markus Wagner
Journal/Conference Name BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Paper Category
Paper Abstract Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents (profile effects). Second, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences (conditional evaluation). We argue for a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, we use new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. Our findings pose a dilemma for political systems which rely on strong and cohesive parties.
Date of publication 2016
Code Programming Language R
Comment

Copyright Researcher 2022