Mediating the Electoral Connection: The Information Effects of Voter Signals on Legislative Behavior
View Researcher's Other CodesDisclaimer: The provided code links for this paper are external links. Science Nest has no responsibility for the accuracy, legality or content of these links. Also, by downloading this code(s), you agree to comply with the terms of use as set out by the author(s) of the code(s).
Authors | John A. Henderson, John M. Brooks |
Journal/Conference Name | THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS |
Paper Category | Social Sciences |
Paper Abstract | We develop and assess an information account of representation. Accordingly, politicians face uncertainty about voter opinion and use previous vote margins to gauge future electoral outcomes. Losses in vote support elicit ideological moderation given new information about electorates. To test this account, we use rain around Election Day as a natural experiment in voting in the US House races from 1956 to 2008. We find that each additional inch of rainfall exogenously dampens Democratic vote margins by 1.4–2.0 percentage points and shifts incumbents rightward in their roll call positions in subsequent Congresses. We find responsiveness mainly in competitive districts with the greatest risk of defeat, and by Democrats rather than Republicans, suggesting an asymmetry in party representation. Overall, we highlight the importance of elite information uncertainty as a mechanism driving the electoral connection, and we show that idiosyncratic electoral effects can meaningfully impact legislative behavior. |
Date of publication | 2016 |
Code Programming Language | R |
Comment |