Testing legislative shirking in a new setting: the case of lame duck sessions in the Korean National Assembly

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Authors Bon Sang Koo, Junseok Kim, Jun Young Choi
Journal/Conference Name JAPANESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Paper Category
Paper Abstract This paper aims to test two types of legislative shirking in a new democracy, South Korea. Using the lameduck sessions of the Korean National Assembly, we test whether a legislator shirks in voting participation and in voting decisions. We weave two competing motivations of legislative shirking in voting participation – that to secure more leisure time and that to utilize the last, valuable voting opportunity – into a synthetic hypothesis and test it with two-part hurdle models. To test a shirking in voting participation hypothesis, we analyze legislators’ choices on bills that are supposedly related to the interests of constituents or political parties. Empirical results strongly support our shirking in voting participation claims, while only partial evidence is found on shirking in voting decisions. The findings suggest that, besides the trade-off between labor and leisure, some legislators deem the lame-duck sessions an opportunity to express their own preferences unconstrained.
Date of publication 2019
Code Programming Language R
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