The partisan ties of lobbying firms
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| Authors | Alexander C. Furnas, Michael T. Heaney, Tim LaPira |
| Journal/Conference Name | RESEARCH & POLITICS |
| Paper Category | Social Sciences |
| Paper Abstract | Organized interests commonly face principal-agent problems in attempting to control the lobbyists under their employ. This article explains how lobbying firms help to curtail these problems by reducing the degree of asymmetric information between lobbyists and their clients. It shows that lobbying firms’ partisan identities provide informative signals about lobbyists’ loyalties. Using data from lobbying records released under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as well as original data collected on lobbying firms, this article examines the effects of partisan ties on firms’ lobbying revenues. The results demonstrate that partisan ties with the majority party of the House of Representatives translate into higher lobbying revenues, but ties with the Senate’s majority party make no significant difference for revenue. These findings provide evidence of the political market value of partisan ties, as well as evidence of perceived differences in the institutional vulnerability of the House and Senate to interest group pressure. |
| Date of publication | 2019 |
| Code Programming Language | R |
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