Voter Uncertainty, Political Institutions, and Legislative Turnover

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Authors Yanna Krupnikov, Rebecca B. Morton, Charles R. Shipan
Paper Category
Paper Abstract Previous analyses of legislative turnover have identified two separate sets of explanatory factors: legislative and electoral institutions, and economic conditions. In this paper we draw on insights from formal theory and political psychology to present a new explanation of turnover, one that incorporates voters, political institutions, and economic conditions. First, we argue that an explanation of turnover needs to take a broader perspective on political institutions. Thus, we examine how separation of powers arrangements can affect turnover. Second, we argue that the effect of these arrangements is contingent on economic conditions (i.e., that separations of powers arrangements and economic conditions interact to influence turnover). Third, we argue that both institutions and economic conditions affect turnover because they influence the ways in which voters can assign responsibility for economic outcomes. We find support for our theoretical propositions in an analysis of legislative turnover in the U.S. states between 1982 and 2000.
Date of publication 2018
Code Programming Language R

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